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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the family affairs of others whereby the wife was induced to leave
the husband, or so conduct herself that the comfort of the married
life was destroyed.
Today this right of action no longer exists in view of the Hanf-
garn and Fearon cases and the fact that the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently decided that no substantial federal question
is involved.' 3 Thus the constitutionality of Article 2-A may be re-
garded as definitely established insofar as it concerns the abolition of
"heart balm" suits. "This does not mean that husband and wife are
no longer entitled to mutual chastity; the statute merely takes away
the right of action." 14 It will be interesting to note if the courts will
once more take cognizance of the remedies employed by outraged
husbands during the early common law.
R. J.M.
CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE-
W11AT CONSTITUTES CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE.-The defendant was
indicted for manslaughter in the second degree I for having with
culpable negligence smoked and handled a cigarette so as to set fire
to a dwelling, causing the death of one of the occupants thereof. The
evidence that was presented to the grand jury showed that the defen-
dant, after drinking three bottles of beer, fell asleep while smoking a
cigarette. He was later aroused by smoke and heat and ran to the
street leaving his door open and failing to warn any other occupants
of the premises. The defense moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the legal evidence received by the grand jury was insuffi-
cient to support the indictment. Held, motion granted, with leave to
the district attorney to resubmit the case to the grand jury. Culpable
negligence is something more than the slight negligence necessary to
support a civil action for damages.2 People v. Hoffman, 162 Misc.
677, 294 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1937).
The facts of the instant case presented to the court another oppor-
tunity to discuss the degree of negligence required to constitute
13 May 24, 1937-Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by Catherine Fearon
challenging the constitutionality of Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act;
October 1, 1937-Lawrence Hanfgarn filed a petition with the Supreme Court
to have Article 2-A declared unconstitutional (motion pending).
14 EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 148.
PENAL LAW § 1052: "Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree,
when committed without a design to effect death: 3. By any act, procurement
or culpable negligence of any person, which, according to the provisions of this
article, does not constitute the crime of murder in the first or second degree,
nor manslaughter in the first degree." (Italics supplied.)
'People v. Angelo. 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927) ; State v. Goetz,
83 Conn. 437, 76 At. 1000 (1910).
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culpable negligence. The courts have always found it a difficult
problem to define the various degrees of negligence, 3 and there has as
yet been no judicial guide which has drawn the precise line between
civil and criminal negligence. The dividing line between the two is
"just as shadowy and vague as that dividing murder from man-
slaughter". 4
Many times the distinction between civil' and criminal negligence
has been made by the use of adjectives such as "culpable", "wanton",
"egross" or "reckless" as distinguished from "ordinary" or "slight".5
The courts of this state, in attempting to define that degree of negli-
gence called culpable, have said, "To sustain a criminal prosecution
there must be evidence to show a reckless and wanton disregard of
the rights of others sufficient to amount to an intent to inflict the
injury or at least be indifferent whether the injury happens or not." 6
Although it is usually a question for the jury to determine whether or
not this exists, just as it is a question of fact whether or not negligence
exists at all, the question may become one of law when the negligence
is so slight as not to reach the required standard, and it is, then, the
duty of the court to direct the acquittal of the accused. 7
The law of New York s following the weight of authority,9 appears
to be that in criminal cases the negligence required must be some-
thing more than the failure to exercise the care of an ordinary prudent
person under the particular circumstances which will allow a recovery
in tort. It is submitted that in defining criminal negligence, the courts
were in reality looking for a substitute for real intent and therefore
where the courts have allowed culpable negligence to take the place
of intent it must be something that is practically equivalent thereto. 10
S" ** * courts must continue * * * to find their anchors somewhere in the
vacillating, nebulous limitations and definitions of degrees of human care which
seem to have no legalistic formula for division save that of each case for itself
to be met as each presents itself." Seitz v. Yates Lehigh Coal Co., 142 Misc.
366, 255 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1931).
'Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (1937) 37
COL. L. REv. 701; People v.-Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927),
this is the leading case in New York on the subject of culpable negligence.
"Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, A Study in Statutory Interpretation(1936) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 1; (1926) 24 MIcrH. L. REv. 286.
'People v. Waxman, 232 App. Div. 90, 249 N. Y. Supp. 180 (1st Dept.
1931).Instant case at p. 446.
'People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487, 9 N. E. 44 (1886); People v.
Polstein, 184 App. Div. 260, 171 N. Y. Supp. 501 (1st Dept. 1918), aff'd, 226
N. Y. 593, 123 N. E. 882 (1918) ; People v. Jackson, 125 App. Div. 873, 110
N. Y. Supp. 807 (1st Dept. 1908); People v. Pace, 220 App. Div. 495, 221
N. Y. Supp. 778 (4th Dept. 1927).
' (1924) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 717; State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N. W.
82 (1923) ; People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 398 (1917) ; State v.
Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167, 20 N. E. 777 (1889). See (1926) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 18.(1924) 22 MIcHa. L. REV- 722, (1926) -24 MIcH. L. Rav. 286, "Perhaps
in the last analysis what the courts really mean by the term 'criminal negligence'
is 'thinly masked intent'. To put the idea in legal terms, are not the courts in
1937)
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Unfortunately, a legislative enactment would be of little assistance in
distinguishing the types of negligence for each case must be decided
on its own particular facts."
It has been suggested that in view of the statute making the
driver of a motor vehicle who leaves the scene of an accident guilty of
a misdemeanor,' 2 that a similar "measure should be enacted imposing
upon a person who negligently starts a fire a duty to take all reason-
able means, short of risking serious injury, to give warning to those
whose lives he has placed in jeopardy". 13
S. S. N.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIAILITY OF WIFE FOR SUPPORT OF
HUSBAND ON PUBLIC RELIEF-SECTIONS 125 AND 128 OF PUBLIC
WELFARE LAw.-The defendant and her husband were married Oc-
tober 8, 1901. Her husband received, from the Department of Public
Welfare of the City of New York, monthly payments as old age se-
curity relief aggregating $2,025, between September 1, 1931 and July
1, 1935. During most of this time, she was of meagre means, posses-
sing neither real nor personal property, until the .death of her uncle.
By his will, she received on May 1, 1935, $1,000. She has since re-
ceived several thousand dollars on account of her distributive share
which will total $29,000. The plaintiff, Commissioner of Public Wel-
fare of the City of New York, seeks to recover from the defendant,
under Section 128 of the Public Welfare Law,' the entire sum paid
requiring as a substitute for criminal intent, intent implied in fact?" (Italics
ours.) (1937) 6 FoR. L. REv. 309, n. 3.
'IN. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 70, subd. 5-a.
'See note 11, supra.
1 N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 125 (L. 1929 c. 565 effective Jan. 1, 1930)
creates the liability, and relatives may be compelled to support under N. Y.
PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 126 or N. Y. CODE OF CGRIM. PRO. § 915. See Hodson
v. Grumlich, 156 Misc. 199, 280 N. Y. Supp. 193 (1935).
N. Y. PuBLIC WELFARE LAW § 126: "Liability of relatives to support.
The husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent, child or grandchild of a recp-
ient of public relief, or of a person liable to become in need of public relief,
shall, if of sufficient ability be responsible for the support of such person."
Note: N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRO. § 914, amended by L. 1933, c. 589, is now
similar to this portion of N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW.
N. Y. PUBLIC WELFARE LAW § 128: "Recovery from a person discovered
to have property. A public welfare official may bring an action against a
person discovered to have real or personal property * * * if such person, or
anyone for whose support he is or was liable received relief or care during the
preceding ten years, and shall be entitled to recover up to the value of such
property the cost of relief. Any public relief received by such person shall
constitute an implied contract."
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